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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

breached his agreement in the policy to assist in the defense of actions
arising out of his acts, the Supreme Court declared that there had been
no breach, because the insurance company had never requested Holmes
to assist it.

After the accident he simply gave notice to the insurance company
and disappeared without being requested to give aid, and so, Bachhuber
v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 274, 229 N.W. 117, which held that a provision
for cooperation in defense in a liability policy is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of an action on the policy, did not apply.
CHARLES ROWAN.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-POLICE POWER-ZONING. The City of
La Crosse vs. Elbertson, a Wisconsin case reported in 277 N.W. 99,
although not deciding any particularly new law, is interesting because
it pertains to the right of a municipal corporation under its police
powers to regulate zoning within its boundaries. The case is not radical;
it makes no fresh departures; it evolves no new principles; it merely
applies fundamental rules of municipal and constitutional law. Nevertheless, the case is attractive because it adds to the already somewhat
fecund law of city zoning which in this day of increasing aestheticism
commands immediate and ardent interest.
In this case the defendant appealed from a conviction before a
police justice court in La Crosse of violating the Consolidated Zoning
Ordinance Number 846 by operating a funeral parlor and undertaking
business within a district set aside by the ordinance for residential purposes. The grounds of the appeal were four-fold; namely, (a) that
the provisions of the ordinance were unreasonable and oppressive as to
the defendant and his rights, (b) that the ordinance was void because
it was an amendment to an invalid ordinance, (c) that it provided no
penalty, and (d) that it reserved for the council of the city arbitrary
power.
The court disposed of these arguments in the following manner:
To the first argument it replied, "Under the rules long since established, recognized, and set forth in the cases just cited, when municipal
legislative action proceeds from authority expressly granted and such
action is based on apparent reason, the decision of the legislative body
is controlling." The court then proceeded to find that the legislative
body was warranted in zoning as it did in view of the general character
of the surroundifigs, stating that if different conclusions as to just
where the line of the district should be, may be drawn from the evidence submitted, the conclusion adopted by the legislative body cannot
be interfered with as long as that body acted within reason. (State

CASE NOTES

ex rel. Carter vs. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269;
Maercker vs. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N.W. 199, L.R.A. 1915 F,
1196 annotated cases 1914 B, 199.)
To the second argument the court said that the amendment was
valid although to a void ordinance because it was an amendment by
name only, being in substance and manner of adoption an enactment,
and therefore of an independent character. Here the court quoted from
the appellant's own concession, "that an ostensible amendment of a
void ordinance may in fact be an entirely new ordinance operating
entirely prospectively and entirely free from dependence on a former
void ordinance and therefore valid as a new ordinance."
To the third argument the court answered that the penalty of the
original invalid ordinance was carried over into the amendment by its
very terms and that the legislative intent by the subsequent amendment was to cure the invalid act. Hence the ordinance had a penalty.
And finally to the fourth contention the court remarked, "The
reservation in the ordinance to the effect that the common council
might upon petition, after public notice and hearing, and after report
by its committee, make changes in the district, does not affect the
appellant. The record is barren of any evidence that the common council ever granted a permit to any person, firm, or corporation for any
use not in conformity with the ordinance. The appellant's rights are
not affected by that provision, and his objection in this particular is
not well founded. Gorieb vs. Fox. 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L.
Ed. 1228, 53 A.I.R. 1210."
The law of this case is in accord with the generally accepted views
(See R.C.L. and Corpus Juris under Zoning and Constitutional Law-.
Police Powers) that a municipality has the right to regulate zoning if
it acts within reason for the public good without seeking to determine
in what manner any premises in the restricted district shall be used,
and further that an amendment to a void ordinance is valid if the
amendment is to cure the defect of the prior invalid ordinance, and
is so complete and sufficient unto itself as to be virtually independent
of the invalid ordinance.
By increasing an already long line of authorities, the decision tends
to settle more thoroughly the rights of a municipality with respect to
zoning.
CLYDE SHEETS.

PERSONAL PROPERTY-SALES-FRAuDULENT

CONVEYANCES.

Inter-

national Shoe Co. v. Hughes, et al. 237 N.W. 77 (Wis.). Justice
Wickhem, in this case resolves the matters of law involved into two

